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
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INFANTRY/ARMOR OFFICERS - DOES OUR FORCE STRUCTURE GIVE US THE --ETC(U)  
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Item 20. continued.  
and the author believes should bring about greater equity in force  
management.

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH BASED ESSAY

INFANTRY/ARMOR OFFICERS - DOES OUR FORCE  
STRUCTURE GIVE US THE DESIRED MIX?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT R. GLASS



10 MAY 1982

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INFANTRY/ARMOR OFFICERS -  
DOES OUR FORCE STRUCTURE GIVE US THE DESIRED MIX?

Infantry, the Queen of Battle! Armor, the Combat Arm of Decision! Both branches demand the utmost of their leaders at every grade. Both branches have the basic mission of closing with and destroying the enemy. Both use fire and maneuver in their combat actions. In short, infantry and armor require the same kind of man to lead them and to follow within their ranks. With our increasing trend toward a more mechanized force, I will examine the officer force structure and question whether we have the appropriate mix of armor and infantry officers in the Army. Second, I will examine the impact of this on career progression within the two branches, and examine what we can do or should be doing.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The Army currently has sixteen divisions in its force structure, ten heavy and six light. The heavy divisions consist of four armored (including one cavalry) and six mechanized infantry divisions, while the light consist of four infantry, an airborne, and one air assault division.<sup>1</sup> In addition, there are three armored cavalry regiments, a separate armored brigade, and four separate infantry brigades. A further breakout of the divisions and the separate brigade and battalion sized units results in a total of 184 active TO&E battalions, including

56 armor battalions, 57 mechanized infantry battalions, 52 infantry battalions (including ten airborne, nine air assault, and two ranger), and 19 cavalry squadrons.<sup>2</sup> Surprisingly, 41% of the battalions are armored or cavalry, while an additional 31% are mechanized infantry. Clearly, we have constructed a heavy, mechanized-armored force structure in our Army. What is more germane to this examination is the impact of the force structure on officer strength authorizations in our TO&E units at division or lower level, and in our total authorizations for infantry and armor officers.

I did not examine all the MTO&Es of the various organizations, but instead made a general assumption that there was no significant change in the total infantry and armor personnel organization from that found in the following TO&Es:

armored division	armored cavalry regiment
infantry division	armored brigade (separate)
infantry division (mechanized)	separate light infantry brigade
airborne division	airborne infantry battalion
airmobile division	ranger battalion

I also recognize there will be differences in the separate brigades' headquarters, particularly in Alaska and Panama. The TO&Es code the officers IN (infantry), AR (armor), and AM (combat arms material). The latter include armor, infantry, air defense, field artillery, and/or military intelligence for the G-2 at division, and the S-2 at lower levels.<sup>3</sup> In addition, those billets coded AM are further sub-coded 11X, 12X, and others to express a specialty preference. In the case of the division chief of staff, he is coded AM in each division with a sub-code 12X for the four armored divisions and 11X for the other twelve divisions. He normally is the personal selection of the division commander with little consideration for the 11X or 12X sub-code in the TO&E. When the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) slates brigade com-

manders to divisions, they do not adhere to the TO&Es, but attempt to insure a mix of infantry and armor commanders in the armored and mechanized infantry divisions. Currently there are two infantry commanders in the armored divisions and seven armor commanders in the mechanized infantry divisions. In the light infantry divisions the mix is done only where practical as with the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. Using the TO&Es listed above, and including only the 184 active battalion sized organizations, the Army would have authorizations for the following numbers of officers in these units:<sup>4</sup>

	AR	IN	AM
COL	3	27	33
LTC	95	134	56
MAJ	180	303	94
CPT	904	1010	55
LT	1289	2441	1

If the combat arms material officers with the infantry (11X) and armor (12X) sub-code are included in the totals, the results are as follows:

	AR	IN	IN/AR
COL	18	45	2.50/1
LTC	104	166	1.60/1
MAJ	206	352	1.71/1
CPT	904	1024	1.13/1
LT	1289	2442	1.89/1
TOTAL	2521	4029	1.60/1

The ratios of infantry officers to armor officers vary greatly by grade from the total ratio of 1.60/1, ranging from only 1.13/1 for captains to 2.50/1 for colonels. The latter figure appears to be an aberration, but is based on the fact that there are no colonels coded AR or AM (12X) in any of the twelve infantry divisions (mechanized, light, air assault, or airborne).

The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) lists the requirements and authorizations for the Army by grade and specialty for each command or major activity. In the case of the TO&E units, those



considered are all found in either Eighth Army, US Army Europe (USAEUR), or Forces Command (FORSCOM). Totals for infantry and armor for these three major commands (MACOMs) in the current TAADS are as follows:<sup>5</sup>

	ARMOR	INFANTRY
COL	49	219
LTC	169	365
MAJ	307	606
CPT	772	1417
LT	1264	2313

If you reduce the above figures by those I listed earlier for TO&E units, division and below, the following results are derived for the three MACOMs:

	ARMOR	INFANTRY
COL	31	174
LTC	65	199
MAJ	101	254
CPT	(132)	393
LT	(25)	(129)

These data raise the following questions:

1. There are more than five times as many infantry colonels as armor colonels authorized in the three MACOMs outside the TO&E units, division and below. Why?
2. There are three times as many infantry lieutenant colonels as armor lieutenant colonels authorized in the three MACOMs outside the TO&E units, division and below. Why?
3. There are 132 more armor captains authorized by unit TO&E, division and below, than authorized by the three MACOMs. Why?
4. There are 129 more infantry lieutenants authorized by unit TO&E, division and below, than authorized by the three MACOMs. Why?

Similarly, if you refer to Annex C, you can examine other commands and activities and question such things as:

1. Why does Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) have

nearly 2 1/2 times as many infantry colonels authorized as armor colonels?

2. Why does Western Command have no armor colonels or lieutenant colonels authorized compared to six infantry colonels and fourteen lieutenant colonels?

3. Why does the United States Military Academy have no armor colonels and one lieutenant colonel authorized compared to three infantry colonels and seven lieutenant colonels?

4. Why does the office of the Secretary of the Army have no armor colonels authorized compared to five infantry colonels?

An adjustment is certainly needed, and for all grades.

The third point I will address is the branch strength by grade and the authorized positions in the TO&E units, division and below. The information below depicts this as well as the percent of officer strength required to fill these billets:<sup>6</sup>

	ARMOR STRENGTH	ARMOR POSITIONS	%	INFANTRY STRENGTH	INFANTRY POSITIONS	%
COL	293	18	6	761	45	6
LTC	609	104	17	1558	166	11
MAJ	869	206	24	2127	352	17
CPT	1902	904	48	3854	1024	27
LT	1878	1289	69	3794	2442	64

What this shows is that the percentage of infantry and armor officers that could fill troop unit positions in the grades of lieutenant and colonel is approximately the same. However, in the middle grades from the fourth to 22nd year of service, the opportunity to serve in troop units for armor officers is 78% greater for captains, 41% greater for majors, and 55% greater for lieutenant colonels. This results in either very different career assignment patterns for infantry and armor officers, or a significant shortfall in officer personnel readiness in armor units compared to infantry units.

Finally, an examination of the officer strength by grade of the two branches at the end of FY81 also reveals the following:

	AR	IN	IN/AR
COL	293	761	2.60/1
LTC	609	1558	2.56/1
MAJ	869	2127	2.45/1
CPT	1902	3854	2.03/1
LT	<u>1878</u>	<u>3794</u>	<u>2.02/1</u>
TOTAL	5551	12,094	2.18/1

The proportions clearly exceed those for TO&E units which I addressed earlier, particularly in the middle grades from captain to lieutenant colonel, and corroborate the widely held belief that infantry branch is more than twice the size of armor in the officer grades. Is the Department of the Army doing anything to correct the apparent imbalance in infantry and armor strength? If the answer lies in accessions into the branches, then it must be no. Accession quotas in FY81 were 1004 infantry and 547 armor yielding an infantry/armor proportion of 1.84/1 which is virtually the same proportion as projected for FY82 (1.85/1).<sup>7</sup> Although this is lower than current strength ratios for lieutenants and captains, it is based on continuation rates (historical and projected) rather than a decision to lower the ratio by increasing armor strength. Continuation rates in the company grades historically have been lower for armor officers than for infantry. In addition to continuation rates, accessions are also based on budgeted strength, needs, and perhaps most importantly, authorizations by specialty in the company grades.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, if we are to man our force with the existing structure in mind, we must consider altering the rate of accessions into the armor branch to build our strength there at the captain, major, and lieutenant colonel level.

## CAREER MANAGEMENT

The second major area in the consideration of infantry and armor officers which I will examine is career management, or more specifically promotions, command selection, and school selection. At the field grade level, each of these processes involves a centralized selection by a Department of the Army appointed board. Each represents a significant hurdle for officers in the professional development portion of their career. Selections are made without regard to branch in all but two cases, battalion command selection which is branch specific and in the FY82 promotion selection to colonel and lieutenant colonel where specialty guidance was given. In this latter case, infantry and armor promotions were not affected as underaligned specialties.

Most officer's goals hinge on promotions. Selection for service at the next higher grade is the Army's signal of their confidence in the officer's potential for future service. An overall selection rate is set for each grade, with the rate decreasing as the grade increases. At Annex D I have listed field grade promotion data for the past four fiscal years. I have limited my consideration to first time considered officers in the primary zone, which I believe offers the best and most consistent basis for comparison. Extracted from the annex are the selection rates presented below:<sup>9</sup>

YG	MAJOR		LTC		COL	
	IN %	AR %	IN %	AR %	IN %	AR %
FY82	84.3	88.2	72.5	79.4	44.6	61.5
FY81	72.1	74.5	71.8	79.4	46.9	52.7
FY80	80.1	81.6	69.5	73.4	46.7	58.0
FY79	75.1	84.3	66.7	66.0	48.6	73.8

It is immediately apparent that selection rates for armor officers for the last four years have exceeded those for infantry officers. More specifically, the infantry selection rate exceeded the armor selection

rate in only one instance, FY79 LTC, and that could have been changed with the selection of only one more armor officer. If you define significant difference as being greater than a 10% increase, then half of the selections involve a significant promotion selection differential, including every colonels selection list over the past four years.

If the missions of the two branches and the expectations for their officers are basically the same, there must be some explanation for the promotion selection rate difference. The first possible explanation is that the efficiency reports are better — difficult to determine why, but efficiency reports are fundamental to promotion selection. The second is that there is an imbalance in quality distribution of officers in the two branches, a hypothesis which I cannot believe unless the retention rate for lower quality officers is much higher in the infantry than armor. The third possible explanation lies in the time spent with troops, doing the kinds of things "in the trenches" that better train them within their specialty and might be favored by promotion selection boards. The time with troops must be greater for the armor officer than for the infantry officer as I indicated earlier, unless there is a significant shortfall in manning armor units compared to infantry units.

The second series of hurdles in the career progression of officers is addressed by the centralized selection for schools, intermediate staff colleges or command and staff colleges, and the senior service colleges or war colleges. Each is more difficult to attain than the comparable promotion — command and staff college for majors and senior service college for lieutenant colonels or colonels. There are no branch quotas, nor are there quotas for combat arms, so all have been

competing equally in the centralized selection process. Most recent data for selection for Command and Staff Colleges (CSC) is shown in Annex F, with extracted data shown below for overall and branch selection rates.<sup>10</sup>

YG	OVERALL	ARMOR	INFANTRY
FY79	14.4%	16.2%	17.2%
FY80	21.7%	29.5%	28.9%
FY81	15.0%	20.0%	21.0%
FY82	22.4%	28.6%	27.4%
FY83	7.9%	7.6%	8.5%

By examining the overall selection rate in Annex F, it can be seen that selection numbers and criteria changed, as the eligible population up through the FY82 selections remained fairly level. However, the important fact is the comparison above of infantry and armor, with the infantry selection rate exceeding armor in odd numbered years, and the reverse true in even years. The only significant difference was in FY83 when the infantry selection rate was 11% greater than armor.

Senior Service College (SSC) selection offers a much different comparison, however. The selection rates extracted from Annex F are shown below and cover the same time frame as the intermediate staff colleges.<sup>11</sup>

YG	ARMOR	INFANTRY
FY79	6.0%	4.8%
FY80	7.9%	6.2%
FY81	12.3%	6.0%
FY82	7.8%	6.4%
FY83	5.4%	5.4%

It is readily apparent that in four of the five years, selection rates for armor were significantly greater than those for infantry. The relatively low armor selection rate in FY83 is partially accounted for by an unexplained increase in eligible armor officers from 473 to 556 when the number of eligible infantry officers remained relatively

constant.

Again, I searched for a possible explanation of the difference in selection rates for senior service college when there is relatively no difference for command and staff college. The first possible explanation is better efficiency reports — difficult to understand, but definitely a factor in school selection. A second possible explanation is an imbalance in quality of officers — again very difficult to explain, especially when the earlier school selection rates are relatively equal. Finally, a possible explanation lies in command, where a higher percentage of armor officers than infantry officers are afforded battalion command opportunity.

Command selection is an aspiration held by most officers in the Army. It epitomizes what most of us feel is at the heart of the Army — service with troops, and at a level where you can have an impact on the soldier. Nowhere is this more aspired to than with combat arms officers. The first centralized selection process for command occurs at battalion level, and is driven primarily by force structure. As I showed earlier, armor officers compete for command of 56 tank battalions and 19 armored cavalry squadrons over the period of time the officer is eligible. Infantry officers compete for command of 57 mechanized infantry battalions and 52 infantry battalions, including airborne, air assault, and ranger. There are additional commands for both infantry and armor officers, to include school and training battalions, but the two ranger battalion commanders must have previously commanded battalions. However, my analysis will continue to focus on TO&E units. Because of increased command tour length over the past few years, the availability of commands has dropped considerably for both armor and infantry commands. For the past three years (the only ones with avail-

able figures), approximately 910 infantry officers and 320 armor officers or 2.8 times as many infantry officers as armor officers have been considered for battalion command.<sup>12</sup> If the total number of commands remains relatively constant, then over a period of time there will be 1.4 times as many infantry as armor TO&E commands. With 2.8 times as many officers competing for only 1.4 times as many commands, it is apparent that infantry officers have half the opportunity of armor officers to command TO&E battalions.

In a related informal study conducted by MAJ MacDonald, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, MILPERCEN, the following assumptions were made:<sup>13</sup>

1. All command tours 30 months.
  2. Year group quality equal.
  3. Year group size is constant (he took a five year average) and remains the same throughout the period of command consideration.
  4. The total number of Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) commands remains constant.
  5. The selection opportunity lasts five years.
  6. The number of command positions is approximately equal for each year group.
  7. The number of command declinations is constant for each year group and not significant in determining command opportunity.
- His figures for command opportunity for all OPMS commands, including school and training battalions, were 21% for infantry officers and 33% for armor officers. If the training battalions are stripped out, the figures are 19% and 32% respectively. In the first case the selection opportunity is 57% greater for armor officers, in the second case it is



68% greater. Whatever approach is taken, all show that armor officers have a significantly greater opportunity to command at battalion level.

Research will show that for infantry and armor officers, battalion command is virtually a requirement for senior service college selection. There have been exceptions, but fewer than one a year over the past several years. This discriminator is logical since fewer armor and infantry officers are selected for senior service college than for battalion command. It will be interesting to see the impact of longer command tours (fewer command selections) on the senior service college selections of combat arms officers.

Brigade level command selection is basically the same as battalion level with one major exception. At brigade level infantry and armor officers compete with each other for commands. This is a reflection of the similarity in missions and the type officers desired by those two combat arms branches, but especially reflective of the combined arms aspect of our organization with many brigades consisting of both tank and mechanized infantry battalions. Over the past five years the trend in selection of brigade commanders has shifted from infantry to armor as shown below from information extracted from Annex E:<sup>14</sup>

YG	INF SELECT	ARM SELECT
FY79	28	11
FY80	24	13
FY81	10	9
FY82	9	12
FY83	15	14

In FY83, 381 infantry officers and 158 armor officers were considered for brigade command; however, selection was virtually equally divided between the two branches as it has been for the last three selection lists. The selection rate for FY83 is 3.9% for infantry officers and 8.9% for armor officers. You have to go back to FY79 to find a list

where the infantry selection rate exceeded that of armor. This trend can also be seen in the current assignments, where of the 47 TO&E infantry and armor brigades or regiments with colonels commanding, 27 are commanded by infantry officers and 20 by armor officers.<sup>15</sup> This should continue to approach equality as the remainder of the FY82 selections and the FY83 selections (both with relatively high armor selections) replace the FY80 and some FY81 selections. A further breakdown is as shown below:

	ARMOR CDRS (06)	INF CDRS (06)
4 ARMOR DIVS	8	2
6 MECH INF DIVS	7	9
6 LIGHT INF DIVS	1	15
5 SEPARATE BDES/REGTS	4	1

The explanation for the difference in selection rates for battalion command is obvious — force structure and branch strengths. The difference in brigade command selection is much more difficult, since force structure plays a role in only a few of the commands to include the separate brigades/regiments. Better efficiency reports are a possible explanation and certainly a factor in command selection — but difficult to understand why one branch would be better than the other. Quality imbalance is very difficult to determine, especially after twenty years and since the number of brigade commands is so small. A possible explanation may lie in the requirements for brigade command — battalion command and war college attendance. Although these are not written, they are logical, and there have been very few exceptions in recent times. Hence, higher battalion command selection rates lead to higher war college selection rates, and therefore, higher brigade command selection rates for armor officers.

## CONCLUSIONS

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this examination of the Army's force structure and officer career progression for the infantry and armor branches. First, an overview of our force structure in terms of infantry and armor reveals an infantry oriented structure although roughly half of the infantry organizations are mechanized. More importantly, however, is the fact that the ratio of infantry to armor battalion sized units, when armored cavalry is included, is roughly three to two rather than a higher ratio as commonly believed. This is true not only for the organizations, but also for officer strength authorizations within those TO&E units.

Second, if the officer strength authorizations within those TO&E units at division level or lower are eliminated, the remaining infantry and armor officer authorizations are heavily weighted toward infantry. It appears as though little attention is paid to the authorizations at the more senior headquarters and activities, and that changes are made to match desired personalities for the senior field grades. It seems obvious that these authorizations should be examined from the total Army perspective. In addition, if this disparity holds true for infantry and armor, what is the status of the other branches?

Third, the proportion of captains to lieutenants authorized in a tank battalion is much higher than in an infantry battalion. As a consequence, if total authorizations are based on TO&E unit authorizations and troop assignments are balanced at the lieutenant level, then we must be below grade in armor captain troop assignments or have a disproportionately high number of infantry captains not serving with troops. Is this proportion justified in terms of the greater require-

ment for captains in armored battalions, or should the infantry reexamine their position?

Fourth, many factors come into play in determining officer accessions, including budget projections, historical and projected continuation/retention rates, and the needs of the service. The key determining factor appears to be authorizations. Since the critical authorizations for determining accessions are company grade, they must be examined in detail to include the point in my previous conclusion. In addition, the force structure must be a better, more accurate guide for authorizations. Since the impact of changes in accession policy will take years before it is felt in the senior grades, it is necessary that it be reviewed continuously with a view toward long-range organizational policy.

Fifth, the time armor officers spend with troops during their careers must be considerably greater than the time infantry officers spend with troops — a fact based on both the officer strengths of each branch and the Army's organization. If this is not true, then the officer personnel readiness of the armor units is less than that of the infantry units, and this is not and should not be an acceptable state in our Army. The great difference in troop time results in widely differing career patterns for infantry and armor officers, an undesirable fact considering the similarity in missions. Again, a closer look at authorizations needs to be made.

Finally, our force structure and officer personnel strength of the two branches forces a discrimination between two similar branches in terms of their missions, capabilities, and qualities desired in the officer corps. This discrimination can be found in the selection rate or opportunity for selection in the following cases when examining

trends of the past four to five years:

- |                              |                             |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| a. Major                     | - favor armor slightly      |
| b. Command and Staff College | - favor infantry slightly   |
| c. Lieutenant Colonel        | - favor armor somewhat      |
| d. Battalion Command         | - favor armor significantly |
| e. Senior Service College    | - favor armor significantly |
| f. Colonel                   | - favor armor significantly |
| g. Brigade Command           | - favor armor significantly |

Army selections are based on performance and the needs of the service, and in many instances are driven by force structure and authorizations. When there is an imbalance, it is logical to assume that many equally or better qualified officers in the senior grades fail to get selected because authorizations are improperly aligned rather than because of quality. If this is not true, and I find that difficult to believe, then the quality of armor officers across the board must of necessity exceed that of infantry officers. Clearly, authorizations and accessions must be examined in detail.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

In line with the conclusions outlined above, there are several short-term and long-term recommendations I propose. The first short-term recommendation is to consider splitting the colonel level command selection list into two lists, one infantry and one armor to achieve equity in command opportunity. The possibility currently exists to make minor adjustments in command opportunity with training commands, however, the most recent breakout for training brigades for the two branches was three infantry and two armor commanders.<sup>17</sup> Currently, this selection process is the only combat arms or combat support arms command selection with officers from two different branches competing for a branch command (I do not consider aviation and special forces as branch

commands). The advantage to such an action would be to force a more equitable distribution of the TO&E brigade command positions based on personnel strength. This could be adjusted in the future with subsequent Army organizational changes. MILPERCEN currently attempts to assign brigade commanders so that there always will be a mix, especially within the ten heavy divisions. The disadvantage arises within these divisions if the brigades which have both tank and infantry battalions are designated to habitually have an infantry commander or an armor commander. However, I recommend MILPERCEN consider splitting the list for the FY 84 selections, and propose the following breakout:

	AR	IN
a. - 4 Armor Divisions	7	3
b. - 6 Infantry Divisions (Mech)	6	10
c. - 6 Infantry Divisions	1	15
d. - 5 Brigades (Separate)	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	18	29

Adjustments could be made after analyzing the approved Division 86 force structure.

The second recommendation concerns battalion command selections. Little can be done with TO&E commands since it is force structure driven, and the disparity will increase with the loss of up to ten mechanized infantry battalions with the Division 86 force structure. Most recently, the split of non-TO&E battalion commands designated for fill from the command selection list was fourteen infantry and eight armor.<sup>17</sup> I recommend a higher percentage of training battalion commands be given to infantry officers vs. armor officers than are currently designated.

Third, MILPERCEN should consider surveying the OERs of infantry and armor field grade officers. This could show a difference in the quality of the officers. However, I feel it will verify my position that the

spectrum of quality is the same, and that the problem is one of assignment patterns that are driven by our force structure and personnel strength.

There are three long-term recommendations I will make. First, if we intend to maintain our current force structure of ten heavy divisions and six light divisions, then the infantry/armor officer ratio within our TO&E units will be approximately 1.6/1 and less than the current strength ratio. Unless there are plans to greatly change the infantry, particularly with the Division 86 structure, we must increase the number of armor officer accessions to correct this disparity.

Conversely, infantry officer accessions do not need to be increased, but should be decreased with respect to those for armor officers. This recommendation is based on either the current force structure or the Division 86 force structure for heavy divisions which reduces the structure of each heavy division by one mechanized infantry battalion. The total percent of officers accessed into the Army in infantry and armor should remain constant at the current level of approximately 27%, but the ratio should reflect the ratio of those authorized in the TO&E units at division level and below as well as the slightly lower continuation rates of junior armor officers. Instead of the current infantry/armor officer accession ratio of 1.85/1, I recommend the ratio be reduced to 1.4/1, or below the ratio of Division 86 authorizations. As an example, this would change the FY82 accessions quota for infantry and armor officers from 945 and 512 to 850 and 607 respectively.

Finally, and most importantly, I recommend that requirements and authorizations for both branches be examined by Department of the Army,

the Infantry and Armor Centers, and by the different MACOMs. It appears to me that the total infantry/armor ratio should approximate the TO&E unit ratio, currently slightly higher than three to two. This should vary with the three MACOMs with major troop units, EUSA, USAEUR, and FORSCOM, but their total should approximate the ratio. Total authorizations could be delegated to the MACOMs and activities. Adjustments could be made within them, but adjustments to the total, and therefore the proportionate authorizations, would only be made with the concurrences from the proponent headquarters and at DA level.

These recommendations are designed to provide greater equity in career management goals and actions for the two branches, and should bring about greater equity in force management. It is important that they be addressed immediately, and particularly in the light of the initiatives in the Division 86 restructuring. They will enhance the qualities and esprit of the officer corps in both branches, as well as the quality of the organizations they serve.



#### ENDNOTES

1. US, Department of the Army, Army Program Objective Memorandum, FY 83-87. Vol II, p. II-E-3, 4.
2. Ibid, p. II-E-3, 4, 13.
3. US, Department of the Army Regulation 310-31 with change 1, Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment, 15 September 1980, p. C-6.
4. US, Department of the Army Tables of Organization and Equipment:  
Airborne Division, TOE 57H4 W/C2, 1 September 1977  
Airmobile Division, TOE 67H1, 10 August 1981  
Armored Division, TOE 17HO W/C5, 20 April 1979  
Infantry Division, TOE 7HO W/C7, 20 April 1979  
Infantry Division (Mechanized), TOE 37HO W/C6, 20 April 1979  
Armored Brigade (Separate), TOE 17-100HO W/C3, undated (current microfiche).  
Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-51HO W/C4, undated (current microfiche).  
Separate Light Infantry Brigade, TOE 77-100HO W/C1, 20 October 1979.  
Airborne Battalion (Infantry), TOE 7-35 W/C4, undated (current microfiche).  
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Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-51HO W/C4, undated (current microfiche).

Separate Light Infantry Brigade, TOE 77-100HO W/C3, undated (current microfiche).

Airborne Battalion (Infantry), TOE 7-35 W/C4, undated (current microfiche).

Ranger Battalion, TOE 7-85H4 W/C1, undated (current microfiche).

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# ANNEX A. Army Organization

<u>Div/Ede</u>	<u>Bdes</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Mech</u>	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Cav</u>	<u>Total Bns</u>
1st Arm Div	3	6	5		1	12
2nd Arm Div*	3	6	5		1	12
3rd Arm Div	3	6	5		1	12
1st Cav Div**	3	6	5		1	12
1st Inf (Mech)*	3	5	6		1	12
2nd Inf Div	3	2	2	3		7
3rd Inf (Mech)	3	5	6		1	12
4th Inf (Mech)**	3	4	5		1	10
5th Inf (Mech)	2	3	3		1	7
7th Inf Div	2	1	1	6		8
8th Inf (Mech)	3	5	6		1	12
9th Inf Div	3	1	1	7		9
24th Inf (Mech)	2	2	4		1	7
25th Inf Div	2			6		6
82nd Abn Div	3	1 (Abn)		9 (Abn)		10
101st Abn Div (AA)	<u>3</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>9 (AA)</u>		<u>9</u>
Subtotal	44	53	54	40	10	157
2nd ACR	1				3	3
3rd ACR	1				3	3
11th ACR	1				3	3
172nd Inf Ede*	1			3		3
193rd Inf Bde*	1		1	2		3
194th Arm Bde	1	2	1			3

<u>Div/Bde</u>	<u>Bdes</u>	<u>Armor</u>	<u>Mech</u>	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Cav</u>	<u>Total Pns</u>
197th Inf Bde	1	1	1	1		3
Berlin Bde *	1			3		3
1/75th Ranger Bn				1 (Rgr)		1
2/75th Ranger Bn				1 (Rgr)		1
1/509th Abn Bn	-	-	-	<u>1 (Abn)</u>		<u>1</u>
Subtotal	8	3	3	12	9	27
TOTAL	52	56	57	52	19	184

\* General officer commands one brigade

\*\* The POM shows a US Army Europe brigade consisting of one armor battalion and two mechanized infantry battalions assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division. The unit is currently assigned to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and has not yet been reassigned.

# ANNEX B. Strengths by Grades

## STRENGTH - FY81

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Armor</u>
COL	761	293
LTC	1558	609
MAJ	2127	869
CPT	3854	1902
LT	<u>3794</u>	<u>1878</u>
Total	12,094	5551

## REQUIREMENTS/AUTHORIZATIONS/DISTRIBUTION

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Req</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Dec ODP</u>	<u>Req</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Dec ODP</u>
COL	385	365	369	108	95	100
LTC	793	739	780	377	365	378
MAJ	1224	1135	1133	661	595	594
CPT	2620	2341	2322	1241	1116	1111
LT	<u>2962</u>	<u>2717</u>	<u>2722</u>	<u>1641</u>	<u>1398</u>	<u>1406</u>
Total	7984	7297	7326	4028	3569	3589

# ANNEX C. Authorizations by Command

Command	LT		CPT		MAJ		LTC		COL	
	<u>IN</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>AR</u>
TAG					1					
USAHSC						1	1			
INSCOM					1		1			
MILPERCEN			3	2	13	8	8	3		
MDW	28		13		3		3		1	
USARJ	1				1		1		1	
WESCOM	133	6	65	1	25	1	14		6	
USACIDC					1					
USACC			3		2		4	1	1	
DEF ACT					2	2	1	2	1	2
CSA					4	2	10	6	6	1
JOINT ACT	2		2		8	2	10	4	8	2
USMA	3		18	11	29	12	7	1	3	
SEC ARMY							5	3	5	
FOAS			8	1	4	3	8	5	14	5
DARCOM	5	3	14	8	5	11	6	16	10	3
TRADOC	231	125	790	321	426	246	289	153	82	33
EUSA	111	40	77	19	30	5	19	6	10	
USA EUR	625	575	396	385	140	125	67	61	23	16
FORSCOM	1577	649	944	368	436	177	279	102	186	33



ANNEX D. Promotions (PZ - First Time Considered)

COLONEL

YG	Total <u>Elig</u>	IN <u>Elig</u>	AR <u>Elig</u>	Total <u>Sel</u>	IN <u>Sel</u>	AR <u>Sel</u>	Total <u>%</u>	IN <u>%</u>	AR <u>%</u>
FY82	1153	249	78	593	111	48	51.4	44.6	61.5
FY81	832	160	55	442	75	29	53.1	46.9	52.7
FY80	1216	210	69	598	98	40	49.2	46.7	58.0
FY79	492	105	42	262	51	31	53.3	48.6	73.8
FY78	866	132	69	385	56	28	44.4	42.4	40.6

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

FY82	1915	327	136	1380	237	108	72.1	72.5	79.4
FY81	1474	291	107	1055	209	85	71.6	71.8	79.4
FY80	1953	354	124	1380	246	91	70.7	69.5	73.4
FY79	1455	273	100	1011	182	66	69.5	66.7	66.0

MAJOR

FY82	2154	350	186	1726	295	164	80.1	84.3	88.2
FY81	2581	527	157	1937	380	117	75.0	72.1	74.5
FY80	2997	528	174	2222	423	142	74.1	80.1	81.6
FY79	3174	523	216	2365	393	182	74.5	75.1	84.3

Specialty guidance given selection boards for FY82 COL,  
FY82 LTC, and FY81 COL (limited)

# ANNEX E. Command Selections

## COLONEL

YG —	IN/AR <u>Elig</u>	IN/AR <u>Sel</u>	IN <u>Elig</u>	IN <u>Sel</u>	AR <u>Elig</u>	AR <u>Sel</u>
FY78	*	40	*	30	*	10
FY79	*	39	*	28	*	11
FY80	*	37	*	24	*	13
FY81	523	19	*	10	*	9
FY82	494	21	*	9	*	12
FY83	539	29	381	15	158	14

## LIEUTENANT COLONEL

FY77		*	101	*	50
FY78		*	77	*	42
FY79		*	88	*	55
FY80		*	85	*	45
FY81		919	54	313	33
FY82		898	43	313	32
FY83		906	49	337	25

\* - not available

# ANNEX F. School Selection

## COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

YG —	Total <u>Elig</u>	Sel <u>Rate</u>	IN <u>Elig</u>	IN <u>Sel</u>	IN <u>%</u>	AR <u>Elig</u>	AR <u>Sel</u>	AR <u>%</u>
FY79	7764	14.4	1374	213	17.2	476	82	16.2
FY80	7129	21.7	1235	357	28.9	498	147	29.5
FY81	7997	15.0	1395	295	21.0	553	112	20.3
FY82	7982	22.4	1334	366	27.4	509	145	28.6
FY83*	14241	7.9	2437	207	8.5	1016	77	7.6

\* first year of year group competition (seven year groups)

## SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE

FY79	1405	67	4.8	553	33	6.0
FY80	1276	79	6.2	483	38	7.9
FY81	1201	72	6.0	457	56	12.3
FY82	1210	77	6.4	473	37	7.8
FY83	1195	64	5.4	556	30	5.4

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